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Abstract: The propensity nature of evolutionary fitness has long been appreciated and 
is nowadays amply discussed (Abrams, 2009, 2012; Ariew and Ernst, 2009; Ariew and 
Lewontin, 2004; Beatty and Finsen, 1989; Brandon, 1978; Drouet and Merlin, 2015; 
Mills and Beatty, 1979; Millstein, 2003, 2016; Pence and Ramsey, 2013; Sober, 1984, 
2001, 2013, 2019; Walsh, 2010; Walsh, Ariew, Mahen, 2016; etc). The discussion has, 
however, on occasion followed long standing conflations in the philosophy of 
probability between propensities, probabilities, and frequencies. In this article, I apply 
a more recent conception of propensities in modelling practice (the ‘complex nexus of 
chance’, CNC) to some key issues, regarding whether and how fitness is explanatory, 
and how it ought to be represented mathematically. The ensuing complex nexus of 
fitness (CNF) emphasises the distinction between biological propensities and the 
probability distributions over offspring numbers that they give rise to; and how critical 
it is to distinguish the possession conditions of the underlying dispositional (physical 
and biological) properties from those of their probabilistic manifestations. 
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1. Evolutionary Fitness as a Propensity to Adapt 
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In evolutionary biology, fitness has long been appreciated by many to be a 
probabilistic disposition, or propensity, to reproduce successfully (see Brandon, 1978; 
Mills and Beatty, 1979). This propensity interpretation of fitness (PIF) is part of a larger 
tradition in evolutionary thinking that takes fitness or adaptiveness to be a causally 
explanatory concept (Sober, 1984, 2001) – and one moreover that can be proudly 
traced back to the pioneering introduction of the concept of probabilistic or 
indeterministic causation more generally (Fisher, 1934). Yet, there has been little 
consensus as to the specific kind of propensity fitness is. On the contrary, there is 
much disagreement in the field as to how to formally represent fitness, how exactly it 
is an explanatory concept, and what exactly it explains. Critics have been quick to latch 
onto such disagreements in order to argue that fitness is not causally explanatory after 
all (Walsh, Ariew, Mahen, 2016), that it does not reflect causal relations (Walsh, 2010), 
and that there are no propensities underlying adaptation phenomena in evolutionary 
biology (Ariew and Ernst, 2009). 
 
 The current impasse suggests that there are fundamental issues at stake 
regarding the nature of propensity and its explanatory power that are yet to be 
clarified. In a recent state of the art article, Millstein (2016) argues that there is 
conceptual work to do; and that debates in the philosophy of probability may feed 
profitably into the discussion of the nature of fitness. This paper takes up Millstein’s 
suggestion, and offers a more complex and nuanced framework than is typically 
assumed for modelling chancy phenomena in general, the ‘complex nexus of chance’ 
(CNC). Contrary to what has been conventional in the philosophy of probability, this 
approach distinguishes clearly propensities from both probabilities and the finite 
frequency data that are used to test them. I argue that CNC bears significantly on a few 
important problems currently discussed in relation with the propensity interpretation 
of fitness (PIF). 
 
The propensity interpretation of fitness follows the standard convention in the 
philosophy of probability to interpret probabilities as propensities, in line with 
Popper’s (1959) renowned propensity interpretation of probability. The CNC is one 
amongst many recent developments in the philosophy of probability that rejects 
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Popper’s reduction of probability to propensity. It instead embraces a plural 
metaphysics, where propensities exist independently, and can give rise in appropriate 
environments to single case chances. It is these single case chances – represented as 
probability distributions within statistical models – which in turn provide the 
explanation of frequencies in the data. On the CNC approach, propensities, 
probabilities and frequencies must all be countenanced – and none can be done away 
with, nor reduced to any combination of the others.  This ‘tripartite conception’ 
(Suárez, 2017, 2020 -see also Mellor, 2005), implicitly abandons the propensity identity 
at the heart of Popper’s view since it favours a distinct and more substantial role for 
propensities to play in the explanation (rather than merely the interpretation) of 
probabilities. In this paper, I argue that the application of this general framework to 
evolutionary biology yields what may be called the complex nexus of fitness (CNF), 
which by necessity starts from the assumption that ‘fitness’ is an ambiguous term 
referring to i) statistical data regarding organisms’ actual offspring numbers and their 
frequencies; ii) probability distributions within population models representing 
expected or hypothetical reproductive successes; and iii) the physical and biological 
supervenience bases of such model-based probabilities, which are taken to include the 
dispositional properties of the relevant organisms. I argue that CNF overcomes some 
of the objections raised against the PIF, by making it explicit that propensities cannot 
be employed merely to interpret probabilities, as Popper thought, but must be 
invoked as separate explanatory entities. 
 
My aim is thus to employ CNF in order to inject some conceptual clarity into the 
discussion, so as to answer some outstanding objections to PIF. The first concerns the 
exact formal or mathematical representation of fitness as propensity. The relevant 
discussion here broaches two technical aspects of statistical modelling, informing what 
are sometimes known as the moments problem and the delayed selection problem 
(Sober, 1984; Beatty and Finsen, 1989; Pence and Ramsey, 2013). On the one hand 
there is the demonstrable empirical fact that fitness is often sensitive to higher 
moments of the statistical distribution for reproductive success. Hence identifying 
fitness with just the statistical mean average (the expected value, or expectation) of a 
probability distribution will often miss out critical differences down the lineage. The 
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differences can be so critical as to entirely reverse judgements of relative fitness 
between individual organisms (or traits, or genes – more about this later on). But the 
idea that fitness, understood as a propensity, must necessarily be identified with some 
or other moment of a probability distribution presupposes that all propensities are 
statistical functions, or formal moments of the distributions. This would be in 
accordance with the conventional wisdom deriving from Popper, but that is nowadays 
questionable in the philosophy of probability, and it is indeed rejected by the CNC.  In 
section three of the paper I consequently suggest that CNF accounts for the statistical 
modelling of fitness without such assumptions, and thus delivers us from the problem 
of moments. 
 
The second narrow technical issue concerns whether fitness is short or long term; 
i.e. whether it involves reproductive success in the most proximate generations, or 
perhaps even just the next generation; or whether, by contrast, fitness refers 
meaningfully only to reproductive success down the generations – or perhaps even 
hypothetical success in some infinite reproductive limit. On a propensity analysis, the 
issue may at first sight seem merely a version of the debate regarding ‘single case’ 
versus ‘long run’ propensity interpretations of probability (Gillies, 2000). If so, the 
delayed selection problem would boil down merely to a difference regarding the 
appropriate type of propensity involved, where those advocating long term fitness 
would be implicitly if not explicitly adopting a ‘long run’ propensity account. However, 
I argue in section four of the article that these distinctions are in fact tangential. Long 
term fitnesses, in particular, are perfectly compatible with ‘single case’ propensities, as 
advocated by the CNC. This has consequences for the precise mathematical definitions 
that are appropriate when modelling fitness in different contexts, and whether or not 
they issue in contradictions.  
 
Then there is the second and more general issue, namely the explanatory role of 
fitness. Advocates of the PIF typically defend the view that fitness is a causally 
explanatory property of biological entities – and for this reason they are sometimes 
known as ‘causalists’ (Abrams, 2012). Critics of the PIF by contrast, tend to view fitness 
as not particularly an explanatory concept – certainly not a causally explanatory one –, 
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but rather a descriptive or generalising concept. 1 In the last substantial section five of 
the paper, I argue that CNF shows both ‘causalists’ and ‘statisticalists’ to be in part 
right. Propensities are indeed explanatory entities, but in accordance to CNC they 
typically explain not frequencies in data, but the single case chances that they give rise 
to within particular chance set ups. Thus ‘fitness’ is indeed often a name for an 
explanatory propensity, but not merely that: it is also a name used for the distinct 
probability distribution within a statistical model that is adequate for the purpose of 
representing the single case chances manifested. And in turn these chances are used 
to account for the actual data recorded in observational studies of reproductive 
success, where ‘fitness’ is also sometimes confusingly used to refer to the finite 
frequencies in the data for reproductive success. The disambiguation of these three 
distinct but mutually related uses of fitness is essential for a better understanding of 
its explanatory power. 
 
My proposal of a complex nexus of fitness is a straightforward application of a 
particular approach to objective chance within the philosophy of probability, the 
complex nexus of chance (CNC). Therefore, it helps to first provide some background 
and motivation on the CNC, as it emerges in discussions over the last decade within 
the philosophy of probability and statistical modelling. The next section introduces 
some of the relevant considerations in the foundations of probability that motivate 
CNC in the first place. It turns out that many of the objections to the propensity 
account of evolutionary fitness are similar to those raised against the propensity and 
 
1 See (Walsh, Ariew and Matthen, 2016), but also (Sober, 1984, Ch. 3) which arguably anticipates the 
statisticalist view in his critique of the causal role of fitness. In more recent work (Sober, 2011) develops 
his view and argues that some of the causal explanations provided by evolutionary fitness are a priori. 
Sober appeals to precisely the sort of powers that I invoke as part of propensity explanations of single 
case chances, i.e. dispositional properties (akin to Molière’s ‘dormitive virtue’). However, as Sober 
points out, these dispositions are probabilistic: Given the appropriate testing circumstances these 
powers give rise not to particular events (as in Molière style deterministic dispositions), but to the 
probabilities of particular events (Mellor, 2005; Suárez, 2014).  Sober’s further distinction between 
sources and consequences of fitness differences is also grist to my mill: On a CNC account, ‘fitness 
differences’ amount to differences in single case chances for survival. The sources of such differences 
are propensities, which – as in Sober’s view –, may be said to ground and causally explain such chances 
a priori; while the consequences of fitness differences are the observed or predicted differences in traits 
-- which are of course the ultimate empirical facts, and explananda, in evolutionary biology. Thus Sober 
(1984, 2011) anticipates the tripartite conception, and the CNF may be understood to be providing 
precision for some of his distinctions. 
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frequency interpretations of probability known to philosophers for decades. Not 
surprisingly, the kinds of retorts that circumvent philosophers’ objections to these 
interpretations of probability are also helpful in constructing an alternative CNF view 
of fitness that dispenses with the objections to the propensity interpretation (PIF). 
 
 
2. The Complex Nexus of Chance in the Philosophy of Probability 
 
 It is nowadays widely accepted 2 that probability is formally defined through 
the four classical Kolmogorov axioms, which can be non-technically summarised (in the 
discrete and finite case) as follows: 
 
Axiom 1:  Probability is a mathematical function or mapping from the domain of a 
   logically closed set of propositions {A} onto the range of the unit interval 
  of the real numbers: . 
 
Axiom 2:  The probability of a tautology (a logical truth) is always 1:    
 
Axioma 3: The probability of a logical disjunction of mutually exclusive elements  
  (say a and b, where each one rules the other out) is the sum of the 
   probability of each disjunct: . (This axiom has a  
  notorious generalisation to the infinite or infinitesimal case, in the so 
   called axiom of countable additivity).  
 
 
Axiom 4:  The conditional probability of some proposition A given another 
   proposition B is given by Bayes’ theorem:  
  
    
 
The philosophical debates have traditionally concerned the interpretation of this 
probability function. According to one school, all probability is subjective degree of 
belief, hence a measure of agents’ ignorance regarding events (or the initial conditions 
 
2 Widely but not universally accepted, as is made clear by the raging debates regarding probabilities 
based upon fuzzy, quantum, and intuitionist logic. There is also considerable debate regarding the 
fourth axiom for conditional probability which is ill-defined when the conditioned upon proposition has 
zero probability (i.e. when P(B)=0) – see Hájek (2003) for discussion. 
f : {A}→ [0,1]⊆ℜ
P Taut( ) =1
P a∨b( ) = P a( )+P b( )
P A B( ) = P(A∧B)P(B) =
P(B / A)P(A)
P(B)
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that would give rise to such events in a deterministic or Laplacean universe). We shall 
instead assume here that probability at least partly – at least in some domains –, refers 
to the objective chances of events, which they possess independently of any agents’ 
knowledge of them. (The assumption that there are such chances is innocuous for our 
purposes, since routine in most natural sciences, including evolutionary biology). But 
what is objective chance, and how can it be an interpretation of probability?  
 
The two main philosophical approaches are the frequency and the propensity 
interpretations. Both have played some role in debates regarding the nature of 
evolutionary fitness. On a frequency interpretation, probability is identified with a 
ratio of outcomes of a type within the full sequence of all outcomes. We may refer to 
this as the frequency identity of probability. Thus, the probability that a coin may land 
heads, on this interpretation, is simply the ratio or frequency of head outcomes in the 
full set of (either heads or tails) outcomes. If the coin is fair, then that ratio is just ½. 
However, there are some very serious problems with this attempt to interpret 
probability, which are by now well known to philosophers, and which many of us think 
make any frequency interpretation untenable. 3 One problem that I like to emphasise 
is the explanatory circularity problem: frequencies cannot explain other frequencies, 
so the frequency identity renders probabilities explanatorily ineffective vis a vis 
frequency data. This seems contrary to the statistical modelling practice to invoke 
probabilities precisely in order to explain frequencies in the data. The problem is, as 
we shall see, acute for the kinds of probabilities that define evolutionary fitness. 
Another classic objection is the reference class problem: the fact that the relevant 
class of outcome events within which one should seek a ratio or frequency of the 
salient type is always underdetermined. Consider the coin toss example again: Is the 
outcome space the set of all outcomes of all tosses of all coins, of just some subset of 
coins, of just the one coin? Should we include the outcomes where the coin bounces 
off, or rebounds, or falls on the edge, or is simply not tossed? Should we include all 
possible outcomes of a similar kind, since any set of actual outcomes is finite and may 
 
3 See Hajek (2009) or Suárez (2020) for a description of this and other problems.  
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always diverge from the underlying probability (a phenomenon known as frequency 
tolerance), etc?  
 
An alternative that gets around such problems is the propensity interpretation of 
probability, advocated by philosophers such as Karl Popper (1959). Again, notice that 
this has traditionally been thought of as an interpretation, not an explanation, of 
probability. (This has impacted the philosophy of biology at least nominally in the 
propensity interpretation of fitness.) On this view, probability is not to be identified 
with any frequency but with the underlying propensities or dispositional properties (in 
what we may call the propensity identity). In the case of a coin toss, this identifies the 
chances with either the full set of physical properties of the coin, or the toss, or some 
subset of both. It is often claimed that the propensity interpretation is explanatory in a 
way that the frequency interpretation cannot be, since it is firmly linked to the 
conditions or underlying properties that give rise to the frequencies in the first place. 
Change the conditions, or the properties of the coin (or the coin toss, or its setup), and 
you will also change the frequencies. Yet, whilst the propensity identity overcomes 
some of the objections to the frequency identity, it has problems of its own too, 
related to what is known in the literature as Humphreys’ paradox.  
 
Paul Humphreys (1985) produced an influential argument that the explanatory 
asymmetries that characterize propensities cannot be represented in terms of classical 
Kolmogorov conditional probabilities – and that this renders impossible any propensity 
interpretation. More generally the propensity identity fails both ways (Suárez, 2014). 
Probabilities are inversible via the fourth axiom of conditional probability: if P (A / B) is 
well defined then so is P (B / A). Yet, if the former has a propensity interpretation, 
whereby B describes the conditions, or dispositional properties of the chance setup, 
and P (A/B) represents the probability that the chance setup yields outcome A, then P 
(B/A) does not have a propensity interpretation, and in fact has no meaning at all from 
a propensity point of view, as the coin toss example illustrates: whatever properties of 
the coin explain its probability of heads, they are not themselves explained, or 
determined by, the heads outcome. On the other hand, Humphreys’ ingenious thought 
experiment (involving subatomic particles being transmitted through a half-silver 
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mirror) shows that some, perhaps most propensities fail to have a coherent 
representation in terms of conditional probabilities. There are a number of different 
responses to Humphreys’ argument, but the most convincing ones abandon any 
attempt to reduce at least some relevant physical probabilities to propensities or vice-
versa.  
 
The complex nexus of chance (CNC) is on board with these recent rejections of 
what we may call the frequency and propensity identities. Instead of trying to reduce 
the notion of probability to either frequency or propensity, CNC fully embraces 
metaphysical pluralism regarding objective chance, accepting the need for 
propensities, single case chances, and frequencies (Mellor, 2005; Suárez, 2014, 2017, 
2020). They are all required to make full sense of the diverse uses of chance in the 
practice of model building: Propensities give rise to the probability distributions in 
models that are empirically confirmed by the frequency data obtained in observational 
and experimental trials. The point of a philosophy of science in practice is not to 
interpret away these categories, but to understand (and, if necessary, to suggest 
changes in) their intricate and productive synergies within the practice of model 
building (Suárez, 2020). In this spirit I now turn to attempts to represent fitness 
probabilities as either frequencies or propensities, and to my argument that an 
account of fitness as a more complex nexus (CNF) involving all three of them is 
required.  
 
 
3. Momentous Paradoxes and the Nature of Statistical Distributions 
 
 One initial difficulty in finding an appropriate mathematical representation of 
fitness is the inconvenient fact that there are different statistics that fitness may quite 
generally be identified with. The first attempts at a propensity interpretation of fitness 
(PIF) identified fitness with the expected value or expectation of the statistical 
distribution for offspring (Brandon, 1978; Mills and Beatty, 1979). Suppose the 
possible offspring of an organism O1 are given by Qi with i= 0, 1,…,n. The statistical 
distribution over O1’s possible offspring {Q0, Q1, …, Qn} in some environment E is then 
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given by some probability function indexed to organism and environment and defined 
over the possible offspring numbers: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏%&&((𝑄+). The expected value or expectation 
of this probability function is its average, or population mean µ, the so-called first 
central moment of the distribution (Krzanoswki, 1998, pp. 14ff.; Grimmett and 
Stirzaker, 1982, p. 51):  
 
  𝜇%&&( = 𝐸𝑥𝑝%&&({𝑄} = ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏%&&((𝑄+)+ ∙ 𝑄+. 
 
Suppose the organism O1 in question has in the given environment either no 
offspring or two offspring with probability ½ in each case. The expected value of O1’s 
offspring in environment E is then exactly one since: ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏%&&((𝑄+)+ ∙ 𝑄+ = 	 &7 ∙ 0 + &7 ∙2 = 77 = 1. The original definition of the propensity interpretation of fitness (PIF) then 
states that the fitness of organism O1 in environment E is its expected offspring value, 
namely, in this case, one. 
 
Yet, this definition has come under heavy criticism ever since originally expressed 
(Abrams, 2009; Mills and Beatty, 1979; Sober, 2001 and 2013; etc). Many of the 
objections rely upon what may be called the underdetermination of statistical 
distributions, the well-known fact in statistics that an indefinite number of different 
probability distributions may have the same expected value, i.e. yield the same 
expectation over a range of outcomes. 4 As an illustration, consider another organism 
O2 in the same environment E with a distinct statistical distribution over its offspring, 
defined by a different probability function: 	𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏%7&((𝑄+). This organism can only 
have exactly one offspring with certainty, i.e. with probability one. Nevertheless, the 
expected value of O2’s offspring is the same as O1’s, since ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏%7&((𝑄+)+ ∙ 𝑄+ = 	1 ∙1 = 1.  
 
 
4 Although the objections ride upon such mathematical facts, they are not essentially mathematical but 
biological, and aim to show that the predictive and explanatory power of fitness differences would be 
left unaccounted for (Sober, 2013). They thus take the form: ‘Given such mathematical facts, if fitness 
were associated with expected value, differences in fitness would not be explanatory or predictive since 
they would miss out other relevant statistics of the distribution’. 
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It stands to reason, however, that these two organisms, O1 and O2, are 
constitutionally distinct, and in particular they differ in their capacities or propensities 
to reproduce in the given environment. Hence, there should be significant differences 
in fitness relative to one another, contrary to the definition provided by the original 
(PIF). This is borne out when considering the higher moments of the respective 
statistical distributions. The second moment about the mean of a distribution is the 
statistic known as the dispersion parameter s2 of the distribution:   𝜎%&&(= =	𝐸𝑥𝑝	 >?𝑄+ − 𝜇%&&(A=B = ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏%&&((𝑄+)+ ∙ ?𝑄+ − 𝜇%&&(A=. This is a representation of 
what is known as the variance about the mean in a population (roughly: how large on 
average the spread of values is about the mean). The variance is always positive – 
since it is a squared quantity – and it is sometimes replaced by another quantity, the 
standard deviation s, which is simply its square root. The larger a variance about a 
mean, the larger the spread of values exhibited by the random variable. A zero 
standard deviation or variance signals a distribution in which all values coincide with 
the mean.  
 
The most common empirical models for fitness show that variance in offspring 
statistical distributions with identical expectations can have considerable differential 
effects on reproductive success (Beatty and Finsen, 1989, pp. 24ff.; Sober, 2001, pp. 
30-34; see also Millstein, 2009, p.609ff.; many of the examples discussed originate in 
Gillespie, 1974, 1977). In these examples two organisms O1 and O2 have distinct 
offspring distribution functions with the same expectation: 𝜇%&&( = 𝜇%7&(, because ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏%&&((𝑄+)+ ∙ 𝑄+ = ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏%7&((𝑄+)+ ∙ 𝑄+. Yet, the variance in O1’s offspring 
distribution is not as large as that in O2’s , pointing to the fact that the first distribution 
is not as spread about the mean:  𝜎%&&(= > 𝜎%7&(= , because ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏%&&((𝑄+)+ ∙?𝑄+ − 𝜇%&&(A= > ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏%7&((𝑄+)+ ∙ ?𝑄+ − 𝜇%7&(A=. The generic difference in variance 
between two distributions with the same mean is illustrated by the two curves (with 
equal expected mean value µ = 6,5 in both cases, yet differing considerably in 
variance) in figure 1 below: 
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The mode of both distributions (the ‘peak’) is at the mean value of 6,5, but in the 
interval of integer numbers one of the curves only ranges from having three offspring 
to having nine, while the other ranges all the way from having one to twelve and has a 
standard deviation twice as large. It is by now well known that there is often greater 
reproductive advantage for those organisms (or traits, or genotypes) that have the 
narrower spread, i.e. the smaller variance or standard deviation. Intuitively, a more 
regular reproductive pattern, or a less spatially or temporally located reproductive 
strategy is superior because the advantage brought about by high offspring in any 
given location (or period, say on a given year) does not balance out the disadvantage 
incurred in the lower reproductive success in other locations (or over longer periods). 
Thus a “lowering in the variance in the offspring number […] can only raise the 
probability of leaving offspring behind” (Gillespie, 1974, p. 605). Elliott Sober (2001, 
pp. 33-34) explains these cases as failures of the commutativity of expectations, on the 
one hand, and quotients or ratios on the other. Quite generally, the expectation of a 
ratio of two quantities is not the same as the ratio of the expectations of such 
quantities. Since frequencies are ratios, or proportions of attributes in populations, the 
expectation of a certain frequency in the population is not identical to the ratio of the 
expectations (of attribute, and overall population). This is helpful as an illustration of 
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the general phenomenon, particularly for trait fitness. It shows that the phenomenon 
of variance-dependence of fitness is general and it does not demand any particular 
interpretation of the probabilities at stake. Rather, as I shall argue, the phenomenon 
calls for an explicit distinction between propensities and their probabilistic 
manifestations in single case chances, regardless of how we interpret those chances. 5 
 
In fact, the phenomena are more complex still since the effects of variance (in 
distributions with identical expectations) on reproductive success are further 
compounded by even higher moments of the statistical distribution. The third moment 
about the mean of a distribution is its skewness, referred to as g, which serves to pick 
out asymmetries in the tails of the distribution either side of the mean. Formally, the 
third moment of the statistical offspring distribution for organism O1 is expressed as 
(Krzanowski, 1998, p. 16-17) : 𝛾%&&( = 	𝐸𝑥𝑝	 >?𝑄+ − 𝜇%&&(AEB = ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏%&&((𝑄+)+ ∙?𝑄+ − 𝜇%&&(AE. A distribution with g = 0 is symmetrical about the mean; one with g > 0 
will exhibit a long tail of high values and a bunched up tail of low values; another one 
with g < 0, will be bunched in the high values with a longer tail in the low values (see 
figure 2). The variance and expectation (mean) can be the same in all three.  
 
 
 
 
 
5 I have in the past defended a (Sober, 2010) style no-theory theory of single case chances, but my 
claims are more generally compatible with any sufficiently deflationary account of objective probability 
(Suárez, 2020, chapter 10).  
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It turns out that, all other things being equal, those distributions with larger 
skewness tend to correspond to organisms with greater reproductive success (Beatty 
and Finsen, 1989). There is hence a certain ‘trumping’ hierarchy: expected mean –> 
variance –> skewness, whereby lower variance and higher skewness can indicate 
greater reproductive success, and hence greater fitness, even though the expectations 
are the same. The intuitive way around such difficulties is to relinquish the 
identification of fitness with the expected value of the statistical distribution for 
offspring. Instead, one may suppose that fitness ought to be identified with the 
distribution as a whole – not any one particular statistic thereof. And this is moreover 
a natural move in thinking of the fitness of an organism (or a trait, or a genotype) along 
the lines of a propensity interpretation of probability. Most current versions of the 
propensity interpretation of fitness (PIF) decisively move in this direction, and away 
from identifying fitness with expectation (Brandon, 1990; Beatty and Finsen, 1989; 
Pence and Ramsey, 2013; Sober, 2001, 2011, 2013). 
 
The next section raises more general issues and difficulties with current propensity 
interpretations of the entire statistical distribution for offspring. But it is worth noting 
already that it is compromised by even more complex phenomena regarding the 
higher moments of the distribution.  Not only do higher moments determine fitness 
for otherwise statistically identical distributions of reproductive offspring. More 
remarkable still is that the higher moments can occasionally trump the lower ones. 
Thus a smaller variance can compensate for a smaller expectation, as the organism 
with the lowest expected value turns out to be more reproductively successful if its 
variance is considerably smaller; similarly higher skewness can occasionally trump 
larger variance in distributions with identical expectation (Beatty and Finsen, 1989, p. 
24; Millstein, 2016, p. 609-10). In none of these cases is the expected value of a 
distribution a good measure of fitness. And whether expected value is or not 
correlated with fitness will in fact depend on the context. Within some environments, 
as just noted, for some systems, expected value may even be negatively correlated 
with fitness. This suggests that taking the entire distribution, without further 
qualification, as the propensity fitness of the organism is a mistake; the fitness of an 
organism, for instance, seems always relative to a context, since it reflects the effect of 
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the environment on the delicate balance of the diverse statistical moments. No pre-
determined hierarchy of the features or functions of the offspring distribution, taken 
by themselves, seems sufficient as a reliable indicator of fitness. Thus, something more 
complex will be required. 
 
 And, indeed, on a complex nexus of fitness (CNF) view this sort of radical 
dependence upon extrinsic environmental factors, as well as the intrinsic features of 
the mechanisms of reproduction, is only natural. 6 The key is in the distinction between 
the propensities and the probability distributions that they give rise to. In any given 
context, the particular probability distribution that emerges in a given context is as 
responsive to the environmental conditions as to the system’s propensities. (And the 
propensities themselves may be more or less intrinsic to a particular organism or 
population – there are also environmental systems, for instance in ecology, which 
possess wholistic propensities of their own). At any rate, the critical point is that the 
underlying propensities first determine the space of possible outcomes, and then 
define the probability distributions over such outcomes. 7  On this picture, it is not 
surprising that the environment will often influence how the higher moments of a 
distribution relate to the lower ones in effecting changes in the reproductive success 
of organisms. In a different environmental context, there may be different extrinsic 
propensities, and those that are intrinsic may manifest themselves in different 
 
6 The ‘extrinsic’ / ‘intrinsic’ distinction in evolutionary biology has been revived by Peter Godfrey-Smith, 
albeit without any substantive ontological implications (Godfrey Smith, 2009, p. 53). Intrinsic biological 
features or organisms (or traits, or genotypes) are those that “do not depend on the existence and 
arrangement of others”. While they are not more real than extrinsic features, intrinsic features are 
indicative of more paradigmatically Darwinian evolutions by natural selection. Godfrey Smith even 
introduces a measure S of supervenience upon intrinsic properties that suits my purposes well. A high S 
is indicative of a high degree of supervenience of reproductive success upon the intrinsic propensities of 
organisms (traits or genotypes); a low S indicates that reproductive success rather depends on extrinsic 
features, whether they be relational propensities of the environment, including entire ecosystems, or 
the conditions required for the manifestation of the underlying propensities. Thus, on the CNF view, 
biological propensities may be intrinsic or extrinsic, depending on the system and nature of the case, 
but the single case chances that manifest those propensities are always necessarily ‘extrinsic’, and 
reliant on the environmental context and other ‘triggering’ factors.  
7 See Suárez (2018), which also suggests an indexical formulation of the probability distributions to keep 
out any variables representing the propensities out of the chance functions, thus avoiding Humphreys’ 
like paradoxes. The propensities set up the probabilities and their outcome spaces, thus delimiting the 
regime of the possible - not the other way around. 
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probability distributions. This is certainly so for long term reproductive success, but 
often also in very short generational terms.   
 
 
4. Varieties of Propensity and Fitness: The Long Term and the Long Run 
 
The literature on propensities distinguishes long run and single case varieties of the 
propensity interpretation of probability (Hacking, 1965). Long run views are inspired by 
empiricist accounts of evidence, concept formation, and belief (Gillies, 2000), and stay 
as close as possible to frequency interpretations such as Von Mises’ (1928). In a long 
run version, propensities generate stable frequencies in long, limiting, or infinite 
sequences of outcomes (depending on the type of long run propensity interpretation). 
The standard illustration employs the tossing of a fair coin: A long run theory ascribes 
propensities to the conditions that generate a 50-50 frequency in a long, limiting or 
infinite sequence of outcomes of the coin toss. 8  
 
A single case interpretation, by contrast, identifies propensities with conditions 
that uniquely generate the probabilities that obtain in every single experimental trial, 
regardless of whether they are actualised in any actual or imaginary sequence of 
outcomes, however long. In the coin toss example, propensities are identified with the 
conditions required to generate a probability distribution over the possible outcomes 
of any given single experimental trial on a chance setup. In any given coin toss, if the 
coin is fair, the probability of heads / tails is ½. The propensity in this case is the set of 
those properties of the chance setup (including the coin) that make it the case that the 
probability is indeed ½ for any given toss. Whether or not this is a random sequence 
(or a Von Mises’ collective) is immaterial to both propensity and probability.  
 
 
8 While long-run propensities are ostensibly identified with the conditions that generate sequences and 
not with the sequences themselves, the sequences must be a version of what Von Mises called a 
“collective”: A random sequences with a well-defined limit and no possible selection function picking 
out any subsequence within it with a different limit. It can thus be argued that long run propensities are 
indistinguishable in practice from frequencies (Suárez, 2014, p. 219). 
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In other words, in a coherent single case theory propensities and probabilities are 
distinct – the propensities give rise to the probabilities, and both concepts are required 
to make sense of objectively chancy phenomena. Moreover, testing a single case 
propensity requires displaying some experimental frequency that may support or 
contradict the probability distribution that it prescribes. Hence single case 
propensities, if they are in principle to have empirical manifestations and be subject to 
test – as surely most if not all scientific propensities must be – need recourse to 
empirical finite frequencies as the result of experimental trials. In other words, 
adopting a single case propensity theory makes it possible to appreciate the three 
distinct ingredients in any meaningful ascription of objective chance in scientific 
modelling, namely: propensities, probabilities and frequencies. I shall refer to this 
tripartite conception together with their inter-relations, as the “complex nexus”, and 
will advocate employing it as an appropriate tool for the analysis of biological fitness. 9 
 
The rejection of long run varieties of the propensity theory, in favour of the single 
case variety, does not necessarily conflict or contradict the view that biological fitness 
is best understood as “long term” as opposed to “short term”. A long-term view of 
fitness is not just compatible with a single case propensity interpretation of fitness, 
but, I urge, it is best understood in its light: Long term fitness is not long run 
propensity.  
 
Fitness is viewed as a short-term property of an organism (or a population or a trait 
– more about the differences later on), when it entails reproductive success in the 
short term, and possibly in the next generation only. Thus, two organisms O1 and O2 
have different relative fitness if their expected (next generation) reproductive success 
is different. This is straightforward only post facto, and in fact only under substantial 
assumptions. Suppose that throughout their existence O1 has two offspring, and O2 
only one offspring; and suppose only natural selection was acting (no drift, mutation, 
migration): On a short-term view of fitness, O1 is then necessarily fitter than O2.  
 
 
9 See Mellor (2005) for an exposition of single case propensities, and Suárez (2017, 2020) for a defence 
of the tripartite conception in statistical modelling. 
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However, it is well known that the short-term view of fitness has a number of 
paradoxical or counterintuitive consequences (Abrams, 2009; Beatty and Finsen, 1989; 
Sober, 2001). There are certain scenarios and environments where short-term 
reproductive success leads to long term failure and vice-versa (Gillespie, 1977; Pence 
and Ramsey (2016, p. 857) refer to this as the delayed selection problem). The initially 
least successful organism may enjoy greater reproductive success down the road, and 
go on to gain selective advantage, if there are environmental reasons why an early 
overpopulation may turn out to be deleterious in the long term. Thus, suppose that 
resources suddenly and temporarily become very scarce at the next generation. 
Having to feed and protect equally for two offspring may become more costly, to the 
point perhaps that it may lead to the early extinction of both. In this scenario, and 
environment, having only one offspring at an earlier point in time may lead to greater 
reproductive success down the generations, when resources recover.  
 
Even in a two-generation model, with scant environmental variation, it is possible 
for O1 to have greater reproductive success in the short term, as above, while having 
less reproductive success in the slightly longer two-generation term. The classic case is 
the mutation found in some species of drosophila (Crow and Kimura, 1956). If both of 
O1’s offspring die before reproducing, but O2’s sole offspring survives and goes on to 
reproduce, O2 already has reproductive advantage over O1 within two generations. It is 
obvious that such reversals are more likely the larger the number of generations 
envisaged, in whatever complex scenarios or environments, particularly if overlapping 
generations are allowed.10 
 
Fitness is therefore often best understood to be long term. But how long is ‘long’? 
The phenomenon of later on (i.e. two or more generations down the road) reversals in 
reproductive success is well established (Sober, 2001), and it is hard to see what would 
constitute an insurmountable number of generations, or generational threshold, 
 
10 In as much as an entire lineage may be wiped out if the organism reproduces early in what Godfrey-
Smith (2009, p. 51) calls a ‘strongly competitive’ intergenerational environment. 
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beyond which no reversals are biologically possible. 11  For this reason, some defenders 
of long-term fitness define it in an infinite limit. For example, Pence and Ramsey (2016, 
p. 862) define it in terms of Tuljapurkar’s (1990) asymptotic sequences of random, 
non-negative matrices:  
 𝐹 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 HlimL→N OL ∫ 𝑃𝑟(𝜙(𝑤) ∙ ln𝜙(𝑤, 𝑡))	V∈X 𝑑𝑤Z.    (Infinite Fitness) 
 
Nonetheless, such limits only obtain under stringent conditions. For instance, 
Pence and Ramsey’s (Infinite Fitness) equation above demands: i) weak ergodicity, ii) 
that the logarithmic moment of the growth rate be bounded and, most importantly for 
our purposes, iii) that the probability function be generated by a stationary random 
process. Roughly, a random process, i.e. Brownian motion, is one where the values of 
the dynamical variables at a given time do not determine the next values; it is 
stationary if it converges towards its mean or average value. The assumption therefore 
entails that while no daughter population determines any of its direct descendant 
population, the series converges towards its mean or average. While this does not 
amount to (PIF), as usually expressed, it does impose a requirement on the evolution 
of populations that may not always be satisfied in stochastic dynamics. 
 
It has in addition been argued (Sober, 2001; Abrams, 2009) that short-term 
fitnesses also have their uses, and can claim legitimately to be real too. It stands to 
reason that the knowledge that O1’s short-term fitness is greater than O2’s, even if only 
for the next generation, may be very useful for purposes of both prediction and 
explanation regardless of whether in the longer term O1’s reproductive success 
continues to be greater. Or, to take a more extreme example, suppose that the 
environment is such as to generate mass extinction within two generations, anyway; it 
follows that the only concept that is explanatory and predictive in that environment is 
short-term fitness. This pluralist view strikes me as correct: It is not sound scientific 
methodology, and certainly not sensible pragmatic policy, to do away with a concept 
 
11 Biologists tend to define fitness in the long but finite term and remain uncommitted about how long 
that is, which is fine empiricist methodology, but leaves the conceptual questions unanswered.  
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that has its uses – however limited they may be. And there is no better hallmark of 
reality for any concept than finding use within scientific practice.  
 
 Yet, if fitness were identified with long run propensity, in accordance to the 
propensity identity, there could be no such uses of short-term fitness: nothing short of 
the long run would have any reliable expectation value. Since I agree with Sober (2001) 
and Abrams (2009) about the uses of short-term fitness, I am bound to reject long run 
propensity accounts of fitness. But there are more general reasons to reject them, and 
most importantly, the tripartite conception at the heart of CNF is perfectly compatible 
with both long-term and short-term fitness. For, recall, the propensities that are 
employed by the CNF, and the related CNC account of chance, are not identified with 
probabilities. Instead, propensities are employed to partly explain the probabilities 
that emerge in particular contexts in which chance setups operate. This means that the 
propensities, or probabilistic dispositions, of the organism within its environment may 
ground all the particular expected values for its reproductive successes – whether 
short or long term. The propensities, recall, are not themselves the expected values. 
So, while such a distinction (between the probabilities for reproductive success and 
the propensities of the chance setup that generate them) makes no sense in a 
frequency or long run propensity interpretation of probability, it makes perfect sense 
in a CNC. In cases where the limiting value of fitness can be calculated – as in the 
equation (Infinite fitness) above, whenever all its three assumptions apply –, the 
probability distribution that obtains in each generational “trial” is indeed given by 
(Infinite fitness), and the values of reproductive success at each generation are simply 
the random outcomes at each single trial that are consistent with that probability in 
the limit. The phenomenon does not then differ in any significant way from the case of 
a fair coin, i.e. one whose propensities display a single case chance to land heads and 
tails with equal probability ½ in each trial – even though obviously in every trial either 
heads or tails obtains. 12 
 
 
12 Defenders of the most sophisticated recent versions of (PIF) are not always entirely clear whether 
they mean to identify fitness with a long run propensity or a single case one. One may take my 
argument above as confirming that they must mean single case propensities.  
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The tripartite conception within the CNF thus resolves the conundrum between 
short term and long-term fitness by making it clear that fitness is a complex notion, 
that includes propensities and expected values of all statistical distributions for 
offspring, whether short or long term. 13 On this view the fitness of an organism (or a 
trait, or a genotype) is not identified with any of the distribution functions. Neither is it 
identified with the propensities that give rise to the distributions; fitness is rather the 
complex combination of both within each context. An issue undoubtedly remains 
regarding the nature of such an explanatory relation between the underlying 
propensities, on the one hand, and the probabilities of reproductive success that they 
give rise to, on the other. But nothing particularly hinges on whether success is short 
or long term, as both can be accommodated within CNF. 
 
 
5. The Explanatory Role of Fitness 
 
The generic CNC account takes propensities to be dispositional properties of 
systems or chance setups with probabilistic manifestations that can be tested against 
frequency data. The possession conditions for propensities are thus not the same as 
the those for the properties that manifest them, as is more generally the case for any 
dispositional property (think of the possession conditions for the fragility of an object, 
typically describing its internal composition and architecture, which do not coincide 
with the conditions, typically including environmental factors, for the breaking of the 
object). But, in addition, propensities – unlike sure-fire dispositions—, manifest 
themselves only probabilistically. It is then possible to test the probabilities manifested 
against frequency data – and this provides reasons, typically of an abductive sort, as is 
common for theoretical properties, for or against the ascription of the propensities. 
 
 
13 This is in line with the pluralism espoused by Sober (2001, pp. 29ff.), Beatty and Finsen (1989, p. 20), 
and Abrams (2009, pp. 754ff.), albeit for somewhat different reasons. While they emphasise the 
plurality of expectations, and how fitness cannot be reduced to either short or long term, I emphasise 
the plurality of chance itself, and how a set of propensities in a chance setup may give rise to different 
probabilities in different environments, both short and long term. Sober comes close to this view when 
he asserts (2013, p. 337): “Mixing is routine in models of evolution where some probabilities represent 
actual frequencies and others do not”. I agree with this, and I go beyond it in further distinguishing the 
propensities (dispositional properties) from the probabilities themselves.   
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The CNC account fits in better with the practice of statistical modelling, where 
parametrization of the phenomena plays a critical role. It is easier to see the practice 
of parametrization as reliant upon propensities understood as dispositional properties; 
the probability distributions as the emergent properties that get modelled by means of 
the probability distributions; and the experimental outcomes as the frequency data 
that can be used to test them (Suárez, 2017, 2020). The sorts of model explanations 
that are typical in statistical modelling fall out as applications of the parametrizations 
of the probability distributions to the frequency data. It is a plausible conjecture that 
all explanatory uses of evolutionary fitness in practice can be understood in this way, 
as cases of statistical model explanations. If so, I suggest that fitness properly speaking 
is not merely propensity, but it is rather to be identified with the whole complex nexus 
of chance, involving fully the tripartite distinction between propensities, probability 
distributions and frequency data.  
 
It would be beyond the scope of this paper to attempt a complete analysis and 
study of the modelling methodologies in evolutionary biology that bear the conjecture 
out. I will more modestly explore some of the relative advantages of the conception of 
propensities within the CNF as regards some of the recent controversies in the 
philosophical literature. CNF accepts that dispositional properties play a role, so it 
bears similarities with a causal dispositional account of fitness. 14 The difference is that 
CNF rejects both the reduction of fitness to dispositions, embracing instead a tripartite 
conception of fitness. More generally, ‘causal dispositionalism’ (Mumford and Anjum, 
2011) is a monistic doctrine about the metaphysics of dispositions, which attempts to 
reduce probability to causal dispositions, while the complex nexus of chance (CNC), 
and its application to fitness (CNF), take a pluralistic view of chancy phenomena and 
attempt no reduction of either fitness to probability, or of probability to propensities.  
 
CNF instead recommends considering fitness a generalisation over all those 
physical and biological properties that make some organisms ‘fitter’. The probability 
 
14 Drouet and Merlin (2015) consider causal dispositionalism and reject it, while Triviño and de la Rosa 
(2016) defend it. Sober (1984, 2013) is implicitly a defence of causal propensities, which it carefully 
distinguishes from frequencies, hence closest to my views. 
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distributions over offspring – and their statistical moments – supervene upon those 
dispositional properties, or propensities.15 But the properties are not the cause of the 
probability distributions, which are merely the representation of the overall 
expectation of reproductive success. What the properties of organisms do cause (at 
least partly) is of course further properties in themselves and other organisms as they 
evolve (they can also have an effect on their environments, as is nowadays accepted to 
be the norm in niche construction). There has been a tendency in the literature to 
identify fitness with either the frequencies of observed reproductive success (as in 
early circular conceptions of fitness); the probability distributions or their expectations 
(as in the PIF we just reviewed in previous sections), or the underlying properties in the 
supervenience base (as is the case amongst defenders of causal dispositionalism). I 
urge the view that fitness properly understood is all of these taken together – and 
moreover taken in their very productive connection in the practice of modelling the 
phenomena. 16 
 
 I have argued that the pluralism inherent in CNF is the key to its resolution of 
some recalcitrant objections to PIF. CNF recommends explicitly embracing propensities 
not as an interpretation of evolutionary probabilities, but an explanation of how they 
come about. The best way to illustrate its explanatory power of fitness on the CNF 
account is precisely to run through its responses to these issues. I will consider here 
only two issues, but the conjecture is that other discussions and issues in the field may 
take a different form and resolution in light of CNF. I first consider the argument that 
the PIF does not capture the proper objects of fitness (whether they are token 
organisms or genes, or token traits or populations). Then I move to the objection that 
 
15 For overall fitness as a supervenient property, see Sober (1984, Ch.3). Peter Godfrey-Smith (2009, p. 
30) also recommends thinking of fitness as “a compression of a full specification of causal factors”. 
16 CNF chimes in with a number of recent accounts in the philosophy of biology literature that there is 
no space here to discuss in full. Besides being on board with Elliott Sober’s pluralism regarding 
probabilities (Sober, 2013) and sympathetic to his minimalism about single case chances (Sober, 2010), 
CNF chimes in well with the pluralism in Beatty and Finsen (1989). True, it does not restrict it to 
propensities in the way they do (one could say that Beatty and Finsen embrace horizontal pluralism only 
as regards different probability distributions; while CNF pluralism is in addition vertical, since it 
distinguishes three layers in one complex notion of fitness). CNF also agrees with Peter Godfrey Smith’s 
(2009) emphasis on the plural practices of modelling fitness. Finally, Marshall Abrams’ (2015) nuanced 
distinctions between tendential / parametric fitness, mathematical / statistical fitness, and measurable 
fitness can all, I think, be subsumed under the tripartite conception in the CNF.  
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population level properties affect reproductive success rates, yet cannot be said to 
cause them, which would see PIF fail too. 17 In each case, I claim that CNF has the 
promise to resolve tensions, answer objections, and provide greater detail regarding 
the explanatory role of propensities in fitness. 
 
i) The objects of fitness 
 
 Mills and Beatty (1979) distinguished between fitness1 and fitness2, where the 
former is the fitness of an organism, and the latter is the fitness of the type of 
organisms that share some trait. They then identified fitness1 with the expectation or 
expected value of the organism’s offspring distribution – a definition we rejected in 
section three (following Beatty and Finsen’s (1989) own subsequent arguments). 
Nevertheless, if a trait T is defined extensionally as the set of organisms that share T 
(call this set {T}), then the fitness2 of trait T is simply the average of the fitnesses1 of 
the organisms in the set {T}. As Sober (2013, p. 336) puts it: “the fitness of a trait is the 
average fitness of the individuals that have that trait”. The full definition makes it 
explicit that fitness1 is relative to a population P and an environment E, and therefore 
so is fitness2 since it is built upon it. Sober (2013) then goes to argue that neither 
fitness1 nor fitness2 can be understood as propensities, but changes or variations in 
fitness2 may be. For only the latter exhibit the required causal asymmetries, and 
sensitivity to population and environmental conditions. The starting point of CNF, by 
contrast, is that neither fitness1 nor fitness2 can be identified with propensities – on 
pain of running propensities and probabilities together in a way that conflicts with the 
tripartite distinctions within CNC. Rather Mills and Beatty’s fitness1 and fitness2 are in 
my terminology the displays (or manifestations) of underlying propensities. But are 
they displaying the underlying propensities of organisms, sets of organisms, or traits?  
 
 
17 Amongst the many other issues that may be cast in a new light, those regarding causation in 
evolutionary biology naturally stand out. For instance, Walsh (2010) has recently objected that PIF 
entails Simpson-like paradoxes (reversals of conditional probability in subpopulations) and that fitness – 
and natural selection to boot – can therefore not be said to be a cause of evolution. From a CNF 
perspective such Simpson reversals are innocuous, since they only affect the probability distributions 
that emerge in distinct contexts, and not the underlying propensities and their causal effects. 
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 The question is whether traits are just averages over the properties of the 
individuals that make up the set of those organisms that share the trait. If so, since a 
set is extensionally merely the collection of the elements that compose it, only 
individual organisms may be said to display propensities – the ‘propensities’ of traits 
would be merely epiphenomenal. 18 Mills and Beatty’s ‘fitness1’ and ‘fitness2’ are then 
simply the expectation values of the distributions for token organisms, and for sets of 
token organisms, respectively, and they all answer to the underlying propensities of 
individual organisms. The CNF would go along with this and ascribe all relevant 
propensities to the individual organisms. If, on the other hand, traits are alternatively 
defined non-extensionally to be primitive token properties, the CNF would apply the 
tripartite distinction directly on traits, invoking separate (emergent) propensities, their 
manifestations in single chances for those traits, and the observed frequencies of such 
traits, without attempting any further reduction. And since we are no longer defining 
fitness in terms of expected value, or expectation – but rather as a complex nexus of 
propensities, probabilities and frequencies, as modelled relative to a population and 
environment –, it no longer follows that the fitness of the trait is the average of the 
fitness of the member organisms.  
 
 The same argument goes through mutatis mutandis for genes. We can again 
consider fitness1 (G) to be a property of some token allele G, and fitness2 ({G}) to be a 
property of the population of organisms {G} that carry a given genotype. Since CNF no 
longer defines fitness1 to be simply the expectation of the offspring distribution for G, 
it follows that fitness2 is neither the arithmetic average of the expectations. Rather the 
fitness of an individual allele, or a genotype, when it can be defined at all, is a complex 
three-layered notion that includes the propensities of the token allele or genotype, the 
probabilities generated in each particular context, and the frequency data it gives rise 
to when experimentally probed. 19  
 
18 This relies on the above extensional definition of traits as types of organisms. Sober himself makes it 
clear that the mathematical models of trait fitness variation introduce selection coefficients in modeling 
the strength of selection that are not themselves functions of expectations; only the responses to 
selection are expected values (Sober, 2013, p. 340). This suggests to me that Sober does not really think 
of ‘traits’ as merely the set of the organisms that share them. 
19 Except perhaps for fitness regarded as a property of an arbitrary population, which by necessity must 
be defined as some statistical function over the arbitrary set of elements in the population. However, 
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 To sum up, CNF is neutral on the issue of whether fitness applies to individual 
organisms or traits, whether at type or token level. It can be freely applied to token 
organisms, and to traits regarded as types with emergent properties of their own.  On 
the other hand, if traits are treated extensionally, as mere statistical collections, then 
naturally CNF would ascribe propensities to the token organisms, or individual alleles, 
only. 
 
ii) Properties of Populations and Reproductive Success 
 
 Ariew and Ernst (2009) argue that the Gillespie examples discussed in section 
three, which show sensitive dependence on higher moments of the offspring 
distribution, already by themselves demonstrate that evolutionary fitness cannot be 
understood as a propensity. On their account PIF requires fitness to be “a function of 
the properties of individual members of the population within their local 
environmental conditions” (what they refer to as desiderata (C) on any viable PIF). 20 It 
follows, on their account, that Darwinian natural selection (of the fittest) is not an 
explanatory cause, but merely a statistical phenomenon. Their reasoning is 
straightforward: since variance is a population level property, which critically depends 
on population size, it cannot be understood to lie in any particular individual organism. 
Gillespie (1977) showed fitness wi to rely on population size n according to what we 
may call Gillespie’s equation: 𝑤+ = 𝜇+ − 𝜎+= 𝑛] , where µi is the fitness in reproductive 
output, and si is the variance within a generation. This entails that we can increase 
population size – and therefore variance – by adding members even if they “do not 
causally interact with the existing members of the population at all” (Ariew and Ernst, 
2009, p. 294). Yet variance can have a decisive role in determining reproductive 
success, so it follows that the explanation of natural selection involves non-causal, 
merely statistical features of populations at large.  
 
 
the concept of fitness as applied to an arbitrary population – unlike populations naturally defined by 
traits – is of no use in understanding evolution by natural selection.  
20 Ariew and Ernst (2009, p. 291). 
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 The argument does not apply to CNF, which is not committed to (C). It is first of 
all, as just noted, not committed to only taking token organisms as the recipients or 
units of propensity ascriptions. But, in addition, even when applied to individual 
organisms as the appropriate units, CNF is not committed to identifying fitness with 
any one physical property of those organisms, at the expense of the probability 
distributions, and the frequencies observed. Rather CNF takes fitness to be the 
complex combination of all of them, and their interconnections. 
 
 Nevertheless, Ariew and Ernst make the additional point that even if (C) was 
abandoned as a desideratum, there are two other essential desiderata on PIF that 
cannot be jointly satisfied in any case, namely (A): “a fitness concept must be able to 
explain why one trait is expected to be better represented in a population under the 
influence of natural selection”; and (B): “a fitness concept must enable us to compare 
the degree to which natural selection will favour the spread of one trait over another, 
alternative trait” (Ariew and Ernst, 2009, p. 290). Yet, their reasons for thinking that (A) 
and (B) are not co-satisfiable is the fact that for any given evolutionary explanation of 
reproductive success, there is more than one statistic, even more than one 
distribution, that is appropriate in different cases, depending on the environment, the 
population, and the trait or type of organism considered. 21 Since there can be no 
unique comparison, there is no univocal explanation. Ariew and Ernst are therefore 
reading (B) in a particular robust way, as implying that any comparative measure must 
be unique, at any rate for any given set of environmental conditions. Yet, CNF 
embraces pluralism for the statistical distributions that manifest underlying 
propensities – the tripartite conception is in fact of a piece with the thought that 
differences in the environmental conditions, and also in populations, bring out 
different probabilistic manifestations of the underlying propensities. An arbitrary 
 
21 As they write: “no single unified account of fitness that satisfies conditions A and B can be found” 
(Ariew and Ernst, 2009, p. 298). This is echoed in another well-known paper by Ariew and Lewontin 
(2004, p. 348): “any attempt to introduce a unitary analogous concept of ‘reproductive fitness’ into 
dynamical models as a scalar ordinal, which will explain or predict quantitative changes in the frequency 
of types, must fail”.  I do agree if by ‘unitary’ it is meant an account that identifies fitness precisely with 
one and only one property of the organisms involved in each case. Such an account of fitness would be 
anathema to the plural character of CNF explored here. It does not follow though that there are no 
propensities involved in fitness, or that they do not have an explanatory role. 
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change in the membership of the population would not affect the underlying 
propensities of the organisms already included in the population, but it would alter 
their probabilistic manifestation in the group as well as obviously their relative 
frequencies in the set. Ariew and Ernst’s critique relies on running such distinctions 
together. If, by contrast, desideratum (B) was understood to already imply pluralism 
then the CNF naturally fulfils it, since it enables many different comparisons of the 
degrees to which natural selection favours one trait over another, depending 
sensitively on trait, population, environment, and underlying propensity ascriptions to 
either organisms, genotypes, or traits (or any of their sets).  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 In this paper I have defended a new approach to evolutionary fitness in terms 
of what I call the complex nexus of chance (CNC). The resulting complex nexus of 
fitness (CNF) clarifies some of the commitments of a propensity account of fitness. It 
does not attempt to reduce fitness to the concept of propensity, nor does it think of 
propensity as a mere interpretation of probability. Nevertheless, propensities play a 
critical explanatory role in the account, and the tripartite distinction at the heart of the 
CNF is in close agreement with modelling practice. I first showed that the CNF 
overcomes the “momentous objection” regarding the influence of higher moments of 
the offspring distribution. I then argued that it renders superfluous the debate over 
whether fitness is properly long or short term. I finally argued that the explanatory 
power of fitness as a complex chancy nexus is revealed by a careful application to a 
range of issues and contemporary debates within the philosophy of biology. 
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